Visible progress has been made in all these major spheres of activities. For instance, numerous regional institutions have been established and are functioning, and SAFTA has come into effect. A number of activities have been initiated under the rubric of the regional agreements and conventions, regional centers, and the broad framework of people-to-people contact. However, none of these activities and initiatives has had any major direct impact on strengthening the regional cooperation and integration process in South Asia. The heads of the states and the governments have had 15 summit meetings to date. A large number of meetings have taken place among the Council of Ministers (that is, the foreign ministers of these countries) and at the foreign secretary and various offi cial levels. A series of special meetings have included home ministers, agriculture ministers, and fi nance ministers of the region.
There have been no institutionalized responses to the enthusiasm created by some of these activities in the region. The euphoria with which these activities are launched dies down in no time both in the absence of a proper monitoring and evaluation mechanism and because of the lack of involvement of people and nongovernmental institutions in the exercise. There is an increasing feeling that many of these activities are just initiated as summit rituals by the heads of states and governments. An array of literature calls SAARC "ritualistic," describes it as "suffocatingly slow," and criticizes it as a "magnifi cent paper tiger," "political white elephant," "talk shop of no consequence," "military convoy in a mountainous region," "a regional pastime," "a club of tongues," "bureaucratic den," and so on.
This chapter provides specifi c instances in which the SAARC process has failed in fulfi lling its objectives and in meeting peoples' aspirations as the only regional body for almost 24 years.
POVERTY AND TERRORISM VERSUS RHETORIC
AND ACTION
Poverty Alleviation
The 6th SAARC Summit (Colombo, 1991) for the fi rst time accorded the highest priority to the alleviation of poverty in South Asia and established an Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA), including eminent persons from member states. The commission conducted an in-depth study of the diverse experiences of member states and reported their recommendations on the alleviation of poverty to the 7th Summit. The 1992 Commission on Poverty Alleviation set rather formidable macroeconomic targets for the eradication of poverty in South Asia by 2002 (SAARC Secretariat 1992). The Commission provided a radical conceptual framework for poverty alleviation through social mobilization and empowerment in South Asia. To achieve this goal, it recommended that the region would require the following:
An annual growth rate of 9.1 percent. Doubling of per capita income from US$300 to US$600. Lowering of incremental capital-output ratio from 4:1 to 3:1. Increasing the marginal savings rate from the current level to 27 percent or more.
The report elaborately discussed various micro-level interventions and lessons learned from the tedious delivery systems of the state mechanism. In most of the South Asian countries the delivery of services is carried out overwhelmingly by state agencies. Two very striking aspects of this delivery mechanism are found in this region. Firstly, the service delivery mechanism in critical areas like heath, food supplies, education, drinking water, electricity etc., has several layers of sub-institutions and sub-authorities and the actual delivery remains slow, tardy and cumbersome. And secondly, there is literal absence of monitoring and evaluation of the services delivered and poor accountability of the agencies and institutions involved in it. More seriously the leakages and corruption has become both rampant and deep rooted making the issues of transparency and accountability farfetched. This Report also mentioned the emergence of new trends at the grassroots level and discussed the shifting focus from macro interventions to participatory micro development organizations. On the basis of this report, the 7th SAARC Summit (Dhaka, 1993) for the fi rst time committed to eradicate poverty in South Asia by 2002. The declaration stated that "the Heads of State or Government committed their Governments unequivocally to the eradication of poverty in South Asia, preferably by the year 2002 AD through an Agenda of Action" (SAARC Secretariat 1993) which would, among other things, embody the following:
A strategy of social mobilization involving the building of organizations of the poor and their empowerment through appropriate national support mechanisms, with the assistance of respective governments. A policy of decentralized agricultural development and sharply focused household-level food security through the universal provision of daal-bhaat or basic nutritional needs. A policy of decentralized small-scale labor-intensive industrialization, with the choice of effi cient and cost-effective technology. A policy of human development, including the enhancement of the social role and status of poor women, the provision of universal primary education, skill development, primary health care, shelter for the poor, and protection of children. A policy to support the above initiatives with adequate fi nancial resources.
The Summit stressed that within the overall conceptual approach of daal-bhaat, the right to work and the right to primary education should receive priority. This 7th Summit also urged major actors in the world economic scene to create an enabling atmosphere supportive of poverty alleviation programs and expressed the need for a new dialogue with donors.
Despite this lofty and rather challenging declaration of poverty era- "The Heads of State or Government acknowledged that investment in poverty alleviation programs contributes to social stability, economic progress, and overall prosperity. They were of the view that widespread and debilitating poverty continued to be the most formidable developmental challenge for the region. Conscious of the magnitude of poverty in the region, and recalling also the decision of the UN Millennium Summit 2000 to reduce world poverty in half by 2015, and also recalling the commitments made at the fi ve-year review of the World Summit for Social Development (Table 17.1 Continued) to reduce poverty through enhanced social mobilization, the Heads of State or Government made a review of the SAARC activities aimed at poverty alleviation and decided to reinvigorate them in the context of the regional and global commitments to poverty reduction. The Heads of State or Government expressed their fi rm resolve to combat the problem of poverty with a new sense of urgency by actively promoting the synergetic partnership among national governments, international agencies, the private sector, and the civil society. They reaffirmed their pledge to undertake effective and sustained poverty alleviation programs through pro-poor growth strategies and social as well as other policy interventions with specifi c sectoral targets. The leaders also agreed to take immediate steps for the effective implementation of the programs for social mobilization and decentralization, and for strengthening institution building and support mechanisms to ensure participation of the poor, both as stakeholder and benefi ciary, in governance and the development process.
The Leaders directed the Council of Ministers to coordinate efforts to integrate poverty alleviation programs into the development strategies of Member States. In this context, they agreed to reconstitute the Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation, with Nepal as its Convener and Bangladesh as Co-convener, for reviewing the progress made in cooperation on poverty alleviation and for suggesting appropriate and effective measures." e 12th Summit, 2004, Islamabad "We recognize poverty alleviation as the greatest challenge facing the peoples of South Asia and declare poverty alleviation as the overarching goal of all SAARC activities. It is imperative to relate regional co-operation to the actual needs of the people.
Provision of basic needs, promotion of literacy, and better health care are a regional priority. It is important to undertake effective and sustained poverty reduction programmes through pro-poor growth strategies and other policy interventions with specifi c sectoral targets.
The Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation, prepared by the meeting of Finance and Planning Ministers in Islamabad in 2002, is hereby approved.
The reconstituted Independent South Asian Commission for Poverty alleviation (ISACPA) has done commendable work. An effective strategy should be devised to implement suggestions made in its Report Our Responsibility." During the Decade, endeavors-both at the national and regional level-will continue to be made with a sense of commitment and urgency to free South Asia from poverty… They entrusted the ISACPA to continue its advisory and advocacy role in this regard.… They decided to focus on formulation and implementation of concrete regional programmes and projects as well as forging partnerships among all stakeholders." g 14th Summit, 2007, New Delhi "The Heads of State or Government appreciated the Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA) for its elaboration of the SAARC Development Goals (SDGs), which refl ect the regional determination to make faster progress toward attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They agreed that the national plans for poverty alleviation should appropriately mirror the regional consensus reached in the form of the SDGs and the Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation.
Deciding that resource mobilization for achieving the SDGs would remain a high priority in the Decade of Poverty Alleviation, the Leaders directed translation of the highest regional level political commitment into action for creating opportunities for productive employment and greater access to resources for the poor that are essential for them to enhance their livelihood and realize their potentials. They entrusted the Two-tier Mechanism on Poverty Alleviation to monitor the progress and fi ne-tune the approaches toward pro-poor growth process." "The Heads of State or Government … resolved to continue to combat poverty through all available means, including especially through people's empowerment. They committed themselves to continuing to share each other's experiences and success stories of pro-poor poverty reduction strategies such as micro-credit systems, community-driven initiatives and the raising of the consciousness of the poor on their right to resources and development … They emphasized undertaking sustained efforts, including developing and implementing regional and sub-regional projects toward the attainment of ( The 12th Summit (Islamabad, 2004) provided continuity to ISACPA, giving it a special advocacy role to enable it to guide follow-up actions on its report. The Commission was given the task preparing the SDGs (SAARC Secretariat. For the fi rst time, a SAARC Poverty Alleviation Fund (SPAF) was established with contributions to be voluntary or assessed, as may be agreed. India has already offered US$100 million (2005) for poverty alleviation projects with a regional dimension. The SPAF shall function within the SADF, which has been reconstituted, as the SAARC Development Fund (SDF). The three-tier mechanism on poverty alleviation has been replaced by a two-tier mechanism, comprising ministers and the secretaries dealing with poverty alleviation at the national level. In addition, the Secretariat published three regional poverty profi les. could play an overall oversight role on the SDG regional reporting process. However, how far these recommendations will be internalized by the member countries, what institutions they will involve, and in what way the SAARC process will be involved are of signifi cant interest (SAARC Secretariat 2007b).
Suppression of Terrorism
Large-scale terrorist violence continues to beset South Asia today ( Like any other SAARC activity, because of the sensitivity of this issue, the Convention on terrorism has been totally marginalized and made in redundant. Year after year since 1988 the SAARC Summits have passed the same resolution asking the member countries to make enabling laws compatible with the Convention (Table 17 .2). Some member countries have consistently failed to enact enabling domestic legislation that is compatible with the Convention. The absence of this most fundamental action toward implementing the Convention has made it ineffective. Despite their determination to prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, member countries have not been able to share even the basic information.
Terrorist activities both within a country and on a cross-border basis have sharply gone up despite the existence of this Convention. There is no harmonization of domestic legislation, including the sanction regime of the Convention. There is absence of bilateral agreement on extradition. There are differences on the very defi nition of terrorism. Except for some meetings, the STOMD has remained largely ineffective. Most of the information and knowledge base of terrorism in South Asia that are available in the public domain are generated by academic research, and civil society organizations spread over the subcontinent. The STOMD, which was supposed to be the fountainhead of such information, remains largely defunct and inaccessible.
After almost 20 years since the signing of the Convention, the 14th SAARC Summit (New Delhi, 2007) still talked about "working on the modalities to implement the provisions of the existing SAARC Conventions to combat terrorism; narcotics and psychotropic substances; traffi cking of women, children and other crimes" (available at http://www.saarc-sec. org/data/summit14/ss14declaration.htm [accessed on 6 October 2009]). This has rather become a ritualistic practice. The increasing ineffectiveness and uselessness of this Convention is refl ected in the attempts by various member states to pursue bilateral negotiations, the most recent being the "joint mechanism" framework being established between India and Pakistan.
The only way to come out of this rigmarole is to generate public pressure on the member states to seriously implement the Convention. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of South Asians do not even know that such convention exists. This is one of those many conventions that the SAARC member countries signed without consulting the diverse stakeholders in and outside the region. As a result, despite the serious need to regionally combat terrorism, literally no civil society action is conducted under this Convention. At the same time, given the size of the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu, the limited human resources, constricted mandate, and narrow autonomy given to it, not too much really can be expected from the already exasperated and overworked Secretariat.
Today, the South Asia region faces a formidable challenge. The region needs to focus on key actions-for example, domestic legislation to implement the regional conventions should be mandatory and should be completed within an established time frame. As an accountability measure, the inability to implement these conventions within a time frame should have the provision of dropping the defaulting concerned member from the convention or the convention should be abrogated within a stipulated time frame. The tendency of the member states to keep most of the conventions at the sublime level of a signed document only and their hesitation to implement any of them have become common practice in the SAARC process. This is an ominous trend for the future scope and for the confi dence of obtaining regional cooperation.
A visible contradiction is evident on the essential SAARC provision that "no bilateral contentious issues will be discussed in the SAARC forum" and conventions such as the Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. The very nature of terrorism in South Asia has a strong crossborder context and content. The cross-border facets have been the core debate and key tenor of discourse on terrorism in the subcontinent. In such a situation, not discussing terrorism from a bilateral perspective in the name of dislocating a regional forum like SAARC would mean sweeping core issues under the carpet. Additionally, signing an agreement without understanding and accepting the realities of its provisions would further mean pretension, hypocrisy, and public consumption. The option is to drop such provisions from the SAARC process and discuss the issues as openly and as candidly as possible and to sign an appropriate and realistic convention to address these issues.
DELIBERATE INACTION AND POOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Integrated Programme of Action
One can cite several instances of deliberate inaction. The In tegrated Programme of Action (IPA) includes nine areas of coopera tion that form the core of the SAARC process. The IPA provided the fi rm foundation from which regional cooperation could take off. Each IPA is conducted by a Technical Committee, which helps member states build up or reinforce their national capabilities and undertake coordinated programs and activities at national and regional levels. The Technical Committee could examine broad relation ships at the policy level between IPA activities and economic and social development in a catalytic, promotional, and advisory capacity with a view toward incorporating various recommended program s into mainstream development.
Over the years, IPA has undergone several changes, including in the number of its activities. Under the reconstituted SAARC Integrated Programme of Action (SIPA) in 2000, the number of Technical Committees was reduced from 11 to 7 (that is, Agriculture and Rural Development; Communications and Transport; Social Development; Environment, Meteorology, and Forestry; Science and Technology; Human Resources Development; and Energy. As a whole, the SIPA activities have broadly led to personal contact among the experts of the region in their specifi c fi elds of specialization. It has facilitated the exchange of data and information and the creation of seminars, workshops, and training courses.
The nature, extent, and level of activities carried out under the IPA have been benefi cial from the regional perspective only to a limited extent. SIPA activities have never converged toward the real critical priority areas and have failed to engage and involve the nongovernmental organization, experts, profession als, and real benefi ciaries in the interactive game. No two member countries have initiated concrete cooperative ventures. The three major critical drawbacks are as follows: (a) resource crunch, (b) lack of intersectoral coordination and non-implementation of decisions taken that have stunted growth, and (c) effective performance of IPA activities.
The non-implementation of decisions generally can be seen at three different levels. First, within the Technical Committees, there has been a tendency not to follow up the decisions taken in the previous meeting. As a result, a particular issue like a "SAARC weather bulletin" has been discussed year after year, and fresh decisions are taken on the same issue as reminders or reiteration. This becomes particular ly serious because in most cases a Technical Committee Meeting takes place after a one-year gap. Second, the non-implementation of decisions and recommendations can be seen at the workshop and seminar levels. Third, the decisions taken by the First Special Session of the Standing Committee and the First MCTC often are not implemented. For instance, the First MCTC had made broad suggestions and had recom mended, inter alia, Universalization of Primary Education by AD 2000, Universal Immunization of Infants by 1995, Provision of Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation by AD 2000. All these targets have been missed one by one. Some of these targets do not fi gure in the various TC's documents. Fourth, region-wide attractive projects that go well with the recommendations made at the global level were defi ned, identifi ed, and given shapes. These projects and programs also went slowly into oblivion and never appeared again. Fifth, even the plans and projects specifi cally recommended by various specifi c Ministerial group meetings have not been implemented.
The non-implementation of decisions in a prolonged manner leads to the repetition of the same activity. For instance, on the initiative of Transport (TC10), a study entitled "Transport Infrastructure and Transit Facilities in the SAARC Region" was completed by an independent agency in Nepal in 1993. For a long time, the report remained under the consideration of the Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC), which requested member states to complete their examination of the report and send their comments. This process has run into so many offi cial processes and grindings that even almost 14 years after its completion nothing has come out of it. This is appalling given the urgent need to improve the connectivity-related infrastructures in the region in the wake of massive economic liberalization. Instead, a new project, SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study (SRMTS), was carried out by the Asian Development Bank for the SAARC in 2006 (SAARC Secretariat 2006a . This study was the result of a decision at the 12th SAARC Summit (Islamabad, 2004) to strengthen transport, transit, and communication links across the region.
SAARC Food Security Reserve
The SAARC Food Security Reserve is another example of how inaction could lead to the erosion of confi dence on the SAARC system. This reserve was established in 1988 primarily to provide for a reserve of food grains to meet emergencies in member countries. Reserves stood at 241,580 tons as of January 2002. In 2002, 14 years after its implementation, the 9th Meeting of the Board (Islamabad, December 2002) for the fi rst time identifi ed institutions and organizations in member states that could be contacted in case of emergency requirements for withdrawal from the reserve. Again after 20 years of sheer non-implementation of the SAARC Food Reserves, this program has been "revamped and renamed" into an "Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Bank" in 2007. This renamed institution discusses the establishment of a permanent headquarters of the food bank with a dedicated staff.
This food reserve has remained notional to date. No one knows its location. So far, the food reserves have never been used despite pressing demands in several disaster situations, including the wheat crisis in Pakistan, a cyclone hit in Orissa, a fl ood in Bangladesh, the tsunami in Sri Lanka, and Maoist violence leading to food insecurity in certain districts of Nepal. Even in the recent cyclone (Sidr) disaster in Bangladesh in November 2007, despite the unprecedented food insecurity in the affected areas, the SAARC Food Reserve was never invoked and utilized. There is no existence of a clear-cut transportation mechanism, border formalities, institutional mechanisms, and appropriate delivery method of the food grains to the recipient countries. The terms and conditions of operationalizing the reserves (that is, prices, mode of payment, conditions of payment, and so on) that remained undecided have now been broadly worked out. However, in the absence of the actual implementation, the effi cacy of these guidelines is yet to be tested.
A serious criticism of the SAARC process has been on the issue of nonimplementation and the dismal performance of action. The SAARC as a regional body has little to show in terms of matching with its foundational objectives and in terms of reaching its benefi ts to the people and institutions in the region. It started with avowed objectives like (a) promotion of the welfare of the people; (b) acceleration of economic growth, social progress, and cultural develop ment; (c) strengthening of collective self-reliance; (d) contribution to mutual trust and understanding; and (e) collaboration and mutual cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, and technical front.
The SAARC process started facing such criticism in the early 1990s. The then leaders had started reacting to such public criticism of nonperformance by voicing such concerns in various SAARC meetings. For example, the 7th SAARC Summit (Dhaka, 1993) had stated in its declaration that:
The Heads of State or Government approved the recommendations of the Eleventh Session of the Council of Ministers for adopting a more business-like and functional approach in the conduct of Summit meetings. They also noted with satisfaction the guidelines and procedures approved by the Eleventh Session of the Council in this respect relating to other SAARC meetings. They decided to meet informally whenever necessary, between Summits. (SAARC, Declarations of SAARC Summits 1985 -1998 , Kathmandu, 1999 In fact, the 13th Summit (Dhaka, November 2005) "directed all SAARC institutions and mechanisms to work collectively towards a decade dedicated to implementation so that a visible and discernible impact can be felt across South Asia" (available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/?id=159&t=7.1 [accessed on 6 October 2009]). The secretary general's analytical report mentioned that "in view of the foregoing directive of the Thirteenth Summit, it is timely for the Technical Committees/Working Groups, their equivalents and other SAARC processes, including the sectoral Ministerial Meetings, to focus on identifi cation of tangible projects" (SAARC, Secretary General's "Periodic Analytical Report," SAARC/SUMMIT.14/SC.33/3 April 2007). It recommended measures as to how SAARC should devote its third decade to implementation.
The SAARC process, notwithstanding its serious nonperformance at the regional level, has not only generated signifi cant interest and enthusiasm in intergovernmental consultation on many areas of common relevance, but also has built confi dence among the member states. It is the only forum in the region that brings together the leaders on an annual basis. This has helped members build confi dence, move ahead on many of the bilateral projects, and resolve a range of problems directly and indirectly. More important, the offi cial SAARC process has triggered a large number of nonoffi cial interactions and contacts among various sets of people and institutions. Many do believe that today the nonoffi cial SAARC process is far more active and robust than the offi cial process. They also believe that ultimately it is the nonoffi cial SAARC that will lead to a people's SAARC and the offi cial process will be forced to be active and operational.
Given the current situations, if drastic measures are not taken to both enhance the capacity of the Secretariat to operationalize the announced projects and also ensure strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to verify implementation of the decisions taken at various SAARC meetings, a situation may emerge in which leaders will year after year talk about the need to have effective implementation, while progress remains stunted. However, a new pattern of introducing programs and implementing them is emerging. The key to this new trend is a member country taking a lead role. For instance, India has taken the lead in a number of concrete activities. The latest examples include the South Asian University, a Tele-medicine Network, and a SAARC Textiles and Handicrafts Museum. These three programs and projects were proposed by India in the 13th SAARC Summit (Dhaka, 2005) . India, while taking up the lead role, prepared concept papers for all three projects in a short time and brought them to the SAARC forum for discussion and approval (Council of Ministers 2006). All three projects are located in India, where implementation has begun (SAARC Secretariat 2006c).
